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The Hasty Wisdom of the Mob: How Market Sentiment Predicts Stock Market Behavior 
M. S. Checkleya, D. Añón Higónb, H. Allesc 
ABSTRACT 
We explore the ability of sentiment metrics, extracted from micro-blogging sites, to predict stock 
markets. We also addƌess seŶtiŵeŶts’ pƌediĐtiǀe tiŵe-horizons. The data ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ďloggeƌs’ feeliŶgs 
about five major stocks. Taking independent bullish and bearish sentiment metrics, granular to two 
minute intervals, we model their ability to forecast stock price direction, volatility, and traded 
volume. We find evidence of a causal link from sentiments to stock price returns, volatility and 
volume. The predictive time-horizon is minutes, rather than hours or days. We argue that diverse 
and high volume sentiment is more predictive of price volatility and traded volume than near-
consensus is predictive of price direction. Causality is ephemeral. In this sense, the crowd is more a 
hasty mob than a source of wisdom. 
Keywords: sentiment, stock market, social media, forecasting, micro-blogging, analytics. 
1. Introduction 
Sentiment metrics derived from social media are claimed to help predict financial market behavior 
(c.f. Bollen et al., 2011, Mittermayer & Knolmayer, 2006). By matching the wording employed, in a 
micro-blog, with a dictionary of mood-related words, millions of financial market-related messages 
can be sampled for the emotions shown by their authors. Mood can be extracted real-time from 
bloggers and, in a fashion, measured. These metrics are aggregated over assets and time to provide 
a dynamic sense of collective market mood. The resulting time series of sentiment metrics can be 
tested for its ability to predict market prices and returns, price volatility, and trading volume. In 
other words, sentiment is argued to predict market behavior. 
While the ƌeseaƌĐh liteƌatuƌe oŶ this topiĐ ďuƌgeoŶs, theƌe is diǀeƌgeŶĐe iŶ sĐholaƌs’ ǀieǁs about the 
underlying predictive ability of social media sentiment metrics. Research findings range from 
sentiment analysis being consistently prophetic, to having modest or selective value, to having no 
forecasting value whatsoever, particularly for price direction (c.f. Nassirtoussi et al., 2014, for a 
review of the research literature). 
To help resolve the growing debate over the supposed value of financial market forecasting with 
sentiment metrics, we explore intraday sentiment and price data for each of five high-profile US 
stocks. Focusing on more granular data than prior authors, we employ intraday market data; 
sampled-every-two-minutes data on price direction, price volatility and trading volume. We match 
the market data to equally-granular sentiment metrics. These data facilitate the study of shorter 
time-horizons – relative to prior research - in the predictive ability of sentiments for prices. We find 
evidence of sentiments causing market behavior, albeit with selective ability to reduce forecast 
errors. Uniquely, we find strongest results over time horizons of minutes, rather than hours or days. 
In sum, sentiment has some short-term predictive value, but more-so when emotions are divergent 
across the market. Forecasts are better in the cases of predicting volatility and trading volume, than 
price direction. Bloggers collectively evince uncertainty more than clarity. 
This study contributes to literature by adding to arguments in favour of emotion being salient to 
investment decision making, by finding unique evidence on the rate at which most valuable 
information diffuses between market participants, and by specifying related classes of trading 
strategy most apt to building on such a predictive foundation. The findings are further embedded in 
the work of Surowiecki, (2004); we argue that the strongest causal links between sentiment and 
market behaviour are found in times of strident and discordant sentiment. Traders collectively form 
a mob more than a wise crowd, but elements of shared sentiment can be weakly-linked to 
predictable price direction. 
This paper is organized as follows: the next section contains a literature review, followed by 
disĐussioŶ of the studǇ’s data aŶd ŵethods. TheŶ ǁe addƌess the ƌesults of the statistiĐal tests. 
FiŶallǇ, ĐoŶĐlusioŶs aƌe dƌaǁŶ, aloŶg ǁith disĐussioŶ of the papeƌ’s liŵitatioŶs aŶd opportunities for 
additional research. 
2. Literature Review 
This section selectively addresses prior literature on two interrelated themes. First, how theory 
frameworks – Efficient Markets, (Fama, 1965), Behavioural Finance (c.f. Lowenstein and Lerner, 
2003), Information Diffusion (c.f. Hong & Stein, 1999), and The Wisdom of the Crowds (Surowiecki, 
2004) – attempt to account for the predictability of markets. Second, we discuss major findings in 
the literature specific to social media sentiment-based prediction of financial markets. 
2.1 Theory of Market Prediction with Sentiment Metrics 
To what extent stock market prices are predictable is a long-standing and high profile debate in the 
finance and economics literature. The Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama, 1965) states that prices 
fluctuate randomly and hence the very act of forecasting is based on misapprehension. Put crudely, 
long-term supernormal trading profits (adjusted for risk) are implausible in efficient financial 
markets. 
However, responding to critiques of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (c.f. Cutler et al., 1989), recent 
studies in Behavioural Finance suggest that emotion has a substantial role in investment decision 
making (Lowenstein and Lerner, 2003). With the speedy expansion of the Web and social media, the 
iŶflueŶĐe of iŶǀestoƌs’ aŶd ǁeď useƌs’ eŵotioŶs has ďeĐoŵe increasingly noteworthy. Traditional 
news media have evolved into diverse forms of blogging and micro-blogging (e.g. Twitter and 
StockTwits), chat rooms and discussion boards. Information can be authored with ease, searched, an 
opinion formed and thereafter rapidly and widely shared (Oh et al. 2013). Emotion about financial 
markets is somewhat contagious and can be diffused and pooled (Oliveira et al., 2013). Hence, most 
of the studies reviewed in this section share a supposition; en masse, social media displays 
measurable emotion and the derived sentiment metrics can plausibly predict buying and selling 
behaviour. This, in turn, affects market prices. 
Consistent with the Gradual-Information-Diffusion model (c.f. Hong, Lim & Stein, 2000, Hong & 
Stein, 1999, Matsubara et al. 2012), investors track market-salient news and opinion flow, and 
gradually and incompletely incorporate such information into their trading decisions. The rate of 
information diffusion to and between market participants influences how market prices shift over 
time. Traded assets avidly-covered by mass and social media would be expected to respond to news 
flow faster than low-profile assets, for which mass media reportage would be sparse or non-existent 
(Matsubara et al. 2012). 
A central issue, related to the diffusion of information, is whether such diverse and decentralized 
opiŶioŶs oŶ soĐial ŵedia, ǁheŶ aggƌegated, ƌefleĐt ͞the ǁisdoŵ of Đƌoǁds͟ (Surowiecki, 2004). Do 
the opinions of bloggers collectively form valuable predictions about markets? Perhaps financial 
ŵaƌkets aƌe susĐeptiďle to ͞gƌoup thiŶk͟, ǁheƌeiŶ a tƌadeƌ’s opinions are not wholly decentralized 
and independent from those of other traders. If so, this would violate the conditions necessary for 
aggregated opinion to outperform experts (Surowiecki, 2004). It has been argued, for example, that 
rather than being diverse and decentralized, opinions are diffused along lines strongly mediated by 
the social networks of influential bloggers (Armentano et al. 2013). 
The study of information diffusion within markets leads to the question of the rate at which 
information spreads. This, in turn, might affect the time horizon for a forecast based on such 
information. Prior literature, whether or not it pinpoints a price-causal role for social media 
sentiments, has tended to focus on forecast horizons of a day or more, with a few engaging with 
data granular to the hour (c.f. Nassirtoussi et al. 2014). Yet we know that market participants 
typically respond to salient market data within one hour (Chordia et al. 2005), and plausibly within 
seconds or thousandths of a second (c.f. Lewis, 2014). 
Meanwhile, social media tends to elicit responses to high-interest blogs within a timeframe of 
minutes, albeit with the potential for an ongoing stream of responses and re-tweets over hours or 
days (PsychSignal, 2014). Putting these insights together, and knowing that social media is already in 
trade-prompting use by a number of market participants (PsychSignal, 2014), it appears worthwhile 
to investigate causal relationships of shorter duration than those prevalent in the extant research 
literature. One might suppose that, for high-profile assets, the duration of any price-causal 
relationship - between social media sentiment metrics and market behaviour - would more typically 
last minutes, rather than hours or days. 
2.2 Predicting Markets with Social Media Sentiment Metrics 
Having reviewed some central theoretical frameworks in the prior sub-section, we now consider 
research specific to predicting market behaviour (particularly asset price movements) with social 
media sentiment metrics. 
The number of Twitter users has grown to several hundreds of millions, resulting in the composition 
of many hundreds or thousands of tweets in a typical trading day for any major stock (PsychSignal, 
2014). Many of these messages respond to unfolding market events. They can be considered a real-
time and near-continual evocation of mood throughout the trading day (Oliveira et al., 2013). 
The idea of extracting sentiment from microblogs, in order to forecast stock markets, inspires a 
burgeoning research stream. Prior research argues that sentiment metrics are materially predictive 
of stock price returns (c.f. Mittermayer, 2004), volatility (c.f. Antweiler and Frank, 2004), and traded 
volume (c.f. Oliveira et al., 2013). In contrast, several researchers find that social media sentiment 
metrics proffer little predictive advantage, particularly for stock returns (for a literature review, see 
Nassirtoussi et al., 2014). 
Bollen et al., (2011), sampled sentiments in six dimensions (Calm, Alert, Sure, Vital, Kind, and Happy) 
and composed, employing artificial neural networks, a model of improved forecasts of the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average. In contrast, much recent research (including this paper) takes emotion to 
have two dimensions: valence (positive or negative); and arousal oƌ ͞leǀel͟ ;loǁ oƌ highͿ 
(Nassirtoussi et al. 2014). 
With a novel method, Makrehchi, Shah & Liao (2013), test the predictive ability of sentiments by 
retrospectively assessing what sentiments plausibly could have been able to predict just before large 
market movements. Using daily analysis, they show that sentiments have sufficient predictive value 
to enable supernormal trading profits. Similarly, Ruiz et al. (2012), explore links between the volume 
of microblog messages and social network properties of those blogging, and market price movement 
and traded volume. They find stronger correlations with traded volume than price movement, but 
nonetheless suggest their results offer promise as the basis of a trading signal. 
While this stream of research provides novel findings, there remain reasons for doubt. 
Many studies use only short periods of sampled data (c.f. Yu et al., 2013). Moreover, most test daily 
data, with very few granular to the half or quarter hour (c.f. Antweiler and Frank, 2004, for data 
tested at ϭϱ ŵiŶute iŶteƌǀalsͿ. AloŶg ǁith ĐoŶtƌadiĐtoƌǇ fiŶdiŶgs oŶ seŶtiŵeŶts’ forecasting value, 
most prior studies have employed daily sentiments and daily market closing prices. Yet, assuming 
that intraday sentiment metrics are predictive of market behavior, there is reason - as argued above 
- to believe any valuable signals would be used speedily by market participants (c.f. Chordia et al., 
2005). 
In this paper, we test five major stocks, with untypically granular data, and over a two year period. In 
this way we lose some of the generalizability of testing, say, hundreds of stocks over months of daily 
data (an approach prevailing in extant literature). But, with granular price and sentiment data, we 
gain deeper insight to the short-term dynamics of sentiments and prices (played out over two years 
of analysis) in the face of widely-exposed mass and social media commentary. In essence, we focus 
on short-term depth and rigor, at the cost of breadth in terms of assets-tested. Any relationships 
found can be tested and perhaps generalized, to additional assets, in subsequent studies. 
Having addressed some of the main findings and limitations of the research literature linking social 
media sentiment to financial market prediction, we progress, in the following section, to outline the 
data aŶd ŵethods eŵploǇed iŶ ŵodelliŶg seŶtiŵeŶts’ putatiǀelǇ-causal relationships with market 
behavior. We assess if sentiments offer better market predictions than naïve forecasting models. 
There is emphasis on the hypothesis that granular data offers insight to shorter forecast horizons. 
3. Data and Methods 
We aim to test if social media sentiment metrics are able to predict financial market behavior, and 
the forecast horizon of any such predictive relationship. In addressing the limitations of prior 
research, we consider more granular data over longer sampled periods, and apply stringent tests of 
the forecasting power of sentiment-based models. In contrast with most prior studies employing 
daily data, and granular – at best – to every quarter hour, we use sentiments measured every two 
minutes and match those to contemporaneous and equally granular price data for five high-profile 
US stocks. We sample the intraday data over a two year period, from both Twitter and StockTwits, 
which compares favourably with prior studies’ use of a feǁ ŵoŶths of data fƌoŵ less ǀoluŵiŶous 
sources of sentiment. In common with Oliveira et al., (2013), we test seŶtiŵeŶts’ aďilities to diŵiŶish 
forecasting error for three pƌiŵe ŵaƌket ǀaƌiaďles: pƌiĐe diƌeĐtioŶ ;also ƌefeƌƌed to as ͞ƌetuƌŶs͟Ϳ; 
volatility; and trading volume. For each forecast so produced we calculate forecasting errors with 
both Mean Absolute PerĐeŶtage Eƌƌoƌ ;͞MAPE͟Ϳ aŶd Root MeaŶ “Ƌuaƌed Eƌƌoƌ ;͞RM“E͟Ϳ ŵetƌiĐs. 
3.1 The Extraction and Nature of Sentiment Metrics 
In order to extract sentiment, the content of each financial market-relevant tweet is matched to a 
dictionary of words salient to the authoƌ’s eŵotioŶal state. Foƌ eǆaŵple, the tǁeet, ͞EǆĐited aďout 
IBM shaƌe: ǁill ďuǇ this ŵoŶth͟, ǁould ďe Đaptuƌed autoŵatiĐallǇ as a positive statement about the 
IBM stock price. The emotive words used in nearly all stock relevant tweets can be so denoted as 
either positive (bullish) or negative (bearish). More strongly emotional content, used in more tweets 
by more writers, would result in higher metrics for either bullishness or bearishness. The process of 
sampling and analysing sentiments is described extensively in, for example, Li and Li (2013), or 
Kontopoulos et al. (2013). 
The sentiment metrics used in this study are generated by the commercial firm PsychSignal 
(www.psychsignal.com). These data are distinctive from prior studies in three ways. First, the 
metrics for either bullish or bearish emotions are scaled from zero (no emotion) to four (strongest 
emotion). Second, the bull and bear metrics are measured independently. Historically, other 
sentiment metrics might have been taken as a continuous variable summing to 100% of extracted 
emotion at any given time. In contrast, the PsychSignal metrics for bullish and bearish sentiment 
form two independent variables, each taking any value from zero to four. Third, PsychSignal extracts 
sentiment from both Twitter and StockTwits. 
Micro-blogging activity on either of the two sampled sources did not commence until 2009. It can be 
argued that a statistically notable volume of relevant user content was not generated until 2010 or 
2011. 
The software employed by PsychSignal is based on the Linguistic Inquiry and Word CouŶt ;͞LIWC͟Ϳ 
framework, which is available to the public along with a description of the methodology (LIWC, 
2016). The LIWC software reads the salient text and calculates the percentage of words in the text 
reflecting different emotions, thinking styles, social concerns, and parts of speech. The process rests 
on the software comparing the text analysed with a dictionary of mood-related words that have 
been assessed by panels of experts for relevance and the ͞stƌeŶgth͟ of eŵotioŶ displaǇed ďǇ ǁoƌd-
use. 
We study 5 well-known stocks: Amazon, Apple, Goldman Sachs, Google, and IBM. 
These were selected because they are well-followed, well-tweeted and large capitalization stocks i.e. 
they can claim to both influence and be influenced by popular sentiment. 
Moreover, they are, uniquely for such equities, each linked to their own volatility markets. 
This invites future research should there be a proven link from the relevant sentiments to 
stock price volatility. 
3.2 Data Corrections 
We consider the alignment of tweeting activity with trading hours. Because we use financial data 
from the NASDAQ and NYSE, we align messages with US trading hours (9:30 am to 4:00 pm) by 
assigning messages posted after 4:00 pm to the next trading day. This is consistent with Antweiler 
and Frank (2004). Thus, sentiments posted after the markets close are bundled to assist in the 
prediction of the market opening price for the following day. This is because these mood metrics 
could only affect the market behavior of a subsequent trading period. 
The financial market price data was sampled from the commercial trading platform TradeStation 
(www.tradestation.com), which is comparable to other such sources, with the typical retrospective 
corrections for mergers, stock splits, etc., normalizing the share price. 
Prices and share trading volume were sampled every two minutes and time-matched to the 
sentiment data for the duration of each trading day. 
3.3 Derived Metrics and Statistical Methods 
In this section, we summarise the data preparation and statistical methods. Two derived measures 
of sentiment are used, following Antweiler and Frank (2004). The first defines an index or metric of 
bullishness (Bt) for each time window as: 
 
Here bull represents an index of positive sentiment tweeted within a particular 2-minute period t for 
a specific stock, while bear represents an index of negative sentiment in the same period for the 
same stock. 
The second measure, also consistent with Antweiler and Frank (2004), is the index of agreement (At) 
between positive and negative sentiments. It is given by: 
 
If all tweeted messages about a particular company are all either bullish or bearish (but not both), 
agreement would, in that case, be 1 at time t. If sentiment is equally bullish and bearish, then 
agreement would be 0. In the absence of tweeted messages for a particular time period, we define 
the bullishness (B) and agreement (A) index for these silent periods as zero, in line with previous 
studies. 
3.3.1 Adjustments to Financial Market Data 
We are interested in three aspects of stock behavior; returns, volatility and traded volume. In 
common with established practice, we compute returns as the difference of the natural logarithm of 
the closing value of the stock price of a particular time period and its lagged value: 
 
We provide two measures of volatility. The first measures realized volatility and follows from 
Andersen et al. (2007): 
 
where RVt is the realized volatility at time t for an interval of 10 minutes and is obtained as the 
squared root of the sum of the squared return, r, during a time window interval. We also compute 
the volatility of stock returns, at t-minutes frequency, as a moving average filter of the stock 
variance at a time window of 10 minutes. Traded volume is a simple metric of the number of shares 
traded in a period. We use the natural logarithm of the traded volume in our analysis. 
3.3.2 Granger Causality Analysis 
To determine what relationships might exist between stock outcomes (returns, volatility and traded 
volume) and tweet sentiment features (bullishness and agreement), we use Granger Causality 
AŶalǇsis ;GƌaŶgeƌ, ϭ9ϲ9Ϳ. A ǀaƌiaďle X is said to ͞GƌaŶgeƌ-Đause Y͟ if Y Đan be better predicted using 
the histories of both X and Y than by using the history of Y alone. Hence, if when controlling for the 
information contained in past values of Y, past values of X add significantly to the explanation of 
current Y, then X is said to ͞GƌaŶgeƌ-Đause͟ Y ;Đ.f. Datta, et al. ϮϬϬϲ foƌ aŶ eǆaŵple of GƌaŶgeƌ 
analysis in the case of information systems). 
FoƌŵallǇ, the possiďle GƌaŶgeƌ Đausal liŶks ďetǁeeŶ stoĐk outĐoŵes ;ǀaƌiaďle ͞“͟, defiŶed iŶ three 
different ways, as, returns, volatilitǇ aŶd ǀoluŵeͿ, aŶd seŶtiŵeŶts ;ǀaƌiaďle ͞T͟Ϳ ĐaŶ ďe eǆpƌessed 
using the parameters of Equation (1): 
 
Therefore, there is Granger causality from T to S if the lagged values of T have a statistically  
significant correlation with S   In all specifications we control for month, day and hour 
fixed effects. 
We test six hypothesized relationships: 
(1) Bullishness Granger causes stock returns, volatility, and traded volume. 
(2) Agreement Granger causes stock returns, volatility, and traded volume. 
The ͞diƌeĐt GƌaŶgeƌ ŵethod͟ is used to test foƌ GƌaŶgeƌ ĐausalitǇ ďetǁeeŶ seŶtiŵeŶts aŶd stoĐk 
behavior. Such models offer indications of both the size and timing of causal effects. An advantage 
of this single-stage method is the estimates of the Autoregression Distributed Lag ;͞ADL͟Ϳ ŵodel ĐaŶ 
remain unbiased in the presence of autocorrelated time series data. In so far as the number of lags 
used in the model is enough to account for time series autocorrelation, no pre-whitening is required 
(Freeman, 1983). However, insufficient lags can yield autocorrelated errors (and therefore 
misleading test statistics); while too many lags reduce the power of the test. 
The final test of our model is to assess if its forecasting errors are materially smaller than those 
generated by the naïve model of forecasting price as identical to the prior period. We assess both 
MAPE and RMSE metrics of forecasting error and apply them in a fashion consistent with Oliveira et 
al. (2013). 
4 Research Findings 
This section presents the results of the prescribed statistical tests. It begins by describing the data 
tested. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the main variables of interests, per company stock, are presented in Table 1. 
We additioŶallǇ Đoŵpute the “peaƌŵaŶ’s ƌaŶk paiƌ-wise correlation coefficient between the 
sentiment data and the financial variables. The results are summarized in Table 2. We find significant 
correlation in most cases, particularly for Goldman Sachs, IBM and Google. For all the stocks, the 
Bullishness index is positively correlated with realized volatility; while Agreement is correlated with 
traded volume, variance and realized volatility. Except for Amazon, the Bullishness index is also 
positively correlated with returns. 
Table 1. 
Table 2. 
4.2 Granger Causality Test Results 
The outcomes of the tests of Granger causation are provided in this section. A sample of the full 
results of the statistical tests can be provided on request. Table 3 shows the p-values resulting from 
the Granger causation tests. The p-value is the probability of the null hypothesis being correct. 
Hence, a small p-value means we cannot reject the presence of a Granger-causal tie from sentiments 
to market behavior. Results are presented for 10 and 20 time lags. The AIC, SBIC and HQIC minimal 
criterion tests suggest that, except for returns, the lag 20 is more appropriate, while for returns it is 
lag 10. 
Table 3. 
Of the 80 p-values considered in Table 3, 44 are significant at the 10%, 5% or 1% levels. Of these 
significant p-values, realized volatility and volume are best represented amongst the market 
behavior variables. Bullishness is more material to returns, while Agreement has more explanatory 
power for volume and volatility. 
Every one of the five tested stocks supports realized volatility and volume being Granger caused by 
either Agreement or Bullishness. Every stock but IBM shows evidence of Bullishness Granger-causing 
returns. Goldman Sachs shows most Granger-causal relationships.  
In summary, the test results are consistent with the Agreement metric predicting realized volatility 
and trading volume. The Bullishness metric similarly predicts, in most cases, returns. The shift from 
10 lags to 20 lags makes modest difference to most salient results. All three market behaviors – 
returns, volatility, and volume – show selective evidence of being Granger-caused by sentiment 
metrics. In this moderated sense, all six hypothesized relationships are supported by the test results. 
4.3 Forecast Error Analysis 
In this subsection, we focus on the forecasting power of sentiment indices. We conduct a one step 
ahead prediction over a three-month period based on a naïve model (the naïve model is concerned 
with forecasting price as simply-generated from a price from the period just prior to the forecast 
period), denoted M0, and an augmented model, M1 (the augmented model uses both prior prices 
and sentiment metrics). The models are represented as follows: 
 
where Y represents the particular financial indicator (return, trading volume, volatility) and X is the 
sentiment indicator. We estimate M1 for both the Bullishness index and the Agreement index, 
respectively. 
To analyse the forecasting accuracy we compute the Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) and 
also the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) as follows: 
 
ǁheƌe the ͞Đapped͟ Ǉ is the pƌediĐted ǀalue, Ǉ is the aĐtual ǀalue, aŶd h is the Ŷuŵďeƌ of tiŵe 
periods over which forecasting is performed. Our dataset goes from the 17th February 2012 to 17th 
October 2014; and we use the last three months, i.e. 17 July 2014 to 17 October 2014, as the 
forecasting period. 
In the regressions, the lag i is chosen to be 20 according to results in Table 3, equivalent to 40 
minutes, and in all models we include controls for hour, day and month fixed effects. The only 
exception is for returns, for which a lag 10 is chosen instead, due to being a better fit to the model. 
Table 4 shows the forecasting errors expressed as MAPE and RMSE measures. Adding the 
Agreement metric reduces both the MAPE and the RMSE for the trading volume of Amazon, Apple, 
Google and IBM. It also reduces the MAPE for the returns of Apple and Goldman Sachs and RMSE for 
Goldman Sachs and IBM. Additionally, it reduces the MAPE for the realized variance of Apple and 
Google; and the RMSE for Amazon, Apple, Goldman Sachs and IBM. Nevertheless, these reductions 
are not large and, in some cases, the forecasting error increases with the addition of sentiment 
metrics. The forecasting power of the Bullishness metric is less impressive, overall, than the 
Agreement metric. 
Note that in Table 4, estimation is from 17/10/2012 to 16/07/2014, and forecasting is from 
17/07/2014 to 17/10/2014. Underlined data indicates that the sentiment-based model produces 
smaller eƌƌoƌs thaŶ the ďase ŵodel ;͞Model MϬ͟Ϳ. 
Table 4. 
In summary, the data show modest reductions in forecast errors upon the introduction of sentiment 
metrics to the forecasting model for market behaviors. Reductions are evident in 29 out of 80 tests. 
This means that in 51 cases out of 80, forecast errors increase with the addition of sentiment 
metrics. For Apple and Goldman Sachs, a sentiment-based model reduces forecast errors for most 
estimates. The Agreement metric performs better than Bullishness, offering more cases of reduced 
forecast error for stock returns, volatility, and volume. 
5 Discussion 
Social media sentiment metrics, extracted from salient micro-blogging activity, are selectively 
Granger-causal of stock price returns, volatility and stock trading volume. However, we find limited 
support for material improvements in predicting those market behaviors. At best, sentiment metrics, 
used very selectively, can claim to help improve financial market forecasting. Importantly, the time 
frame for such forecasts is narrow. The typical prediction window is less than 30 minutes, albeit with 
some small variation between the five stocks analysed. 
In common with researchers arguing that sentiment metrics are materially predictive of stock price 
returns (c.f. Mittermayer, 2004; Bollen et al., 2011), we too find such relationships; albeit in limited 
fashion. Our tests show that sentiment metrics can have material bearing on the forecasting of share 
price direction (resonating with, for example, Makrehchi, et al. 2013). However, the predictability of 
volatility (c.f. Antweiler and Frank, 2004), and traded volume (c.f. Oliveira et al., 2013, Ruiz et al. 
2012, Sprenger and Welpe, 2010), are both better-supported by our tests. We partially-contradict 
those researchers finding that social media sentiment metrics proffer no predictive advantage for 
any of the three market behaviors we study (c.f. Nassirtoussi et al., 2014 for a range of such views). 
We find, in our analysis of the time window of relevant effects, broad support for the view that 
markets respond to new information sources within one hour (Chordia et al., 2005). Most of the 
identified Granger-causal ties from sentiments to market outcomes are operating over a time 
window of less than 30 minutes. And hence, as proposed, high-profile stocks can be associated with 
quite-rapidly diffused sentiment. Our findings are consistent with such sentiment being spread via 
social media. It is also suggestive of prior research and related trading models (largely based on daily 
data) having somewhat missed the richer pickings offered by more granular analyses. 
The model developed in the paper has implications for trading practice. Specifically, it means, if one 
trades on such a signal, that the holding time of a position – the elapsed time between buying and 
selling a financial asset (long or short) - would be typically in the region of 2 to 30 minutes. This time 
frame would be too long for high frequency trading (Lewis, 2014), and too short for most forms of 
options trading (c.f. Lehar et al. 2002). It is apt for short-term trading of assets such as equities, 
indices or forex. Finally, the fact that the model is more-suited to predicting volatility or trading 
volume has implications for risk and trade management (c.f. Dimson, 1979). In particular, our model 
helps predict liquidity and the stability of prices, and hence is an aid to trade management and 
execution, particularly for very large, high-value trades. 
In support of critiques of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (c.f. Cutler, et al., 1989), and recent studies 
in behavioral finance, we too argue that emotion has a material – albeit limited - role in investment 
decision making (Lowenstein and Lerner, 2003). Furthermore, we acknowledge that social media 
creates the prospect of quite-swiftly diffused and shared emotion about events in financial markets 
(Oliveira et al., 2013); our evidence for time-constrained causal relationships from sentiment metrics 
to market behavior supports that view. Investors, on this understanding, are forming trade-
prompting ǀieǁs pƌogƌessiǀelǇ aŶd iŶ ƌespoŶse to otheƌs’ ǀieǁs, as eǀiŶĐed oŶ soĐial ŵedia 
(consistent with the model of Hong & Stein, 1999). Furthermore, our analysis shows sentiment 
metrics better predicting price volatility and accelerated share buying and selling. We are less-able, 
with this data, to predict the valuation of assets. 
We argue, consistent with Oh et al. (2013), it is largely collective uncertainty, and perhaps some 
blending of fear and greed, being widely and quite-rapidly transmitted by social media. These 
socially volatile effects appear more significant than a communal expectation of share price returns. 
Hence, the ǀeƌǇ aďseŶĐe of ͞ĐoŶseŶsus͟ ĐaŶ itself pƌoduĐe the ;ŵeta-level) wisdom of knowing 
there is little directional wisdom. Dissonance of sentiment predicts unpredictability of price 
direction, along with elevated volatility and trading. The market participants we study indirectly and 
quite-rapidly furnish – rather than embody – wisdom. They are more a hasty mob than a wise crowd. 
5.1 Limitations of the Study and Ideas for Further Research 
In common with other such studies, this paper contains a number of limitations, many of which 
invite further study. First, while our study data is, to the best of our knowledge, the most granular 
and long-term to have been tested and published to date, there remains a strong case for studying 
tick price data matched to real time sentiments. It is widely recognized that financial markets 
respond very quickly to unfolding events and so it would be a natural extension of prior studies to 
consider causal effects over ever-shorter intervals. Moreover, our model finds mixed evidence for 
directional prediction from sentiments. Given the value of directional prediction to market 
participants, there is benefit in adding a binary test of directional predictive ability. 
Amongst mixed findings for improved forecast error, we find strongest evidence of predictability for 
Apple and Goldman Sachs. Noting that Apple is the most-tweeted stock of all, this is suggestive of 
predictability being linked to the volume of relevant micro-blogging activity. With only five stocks in 
this study, we cannot yet definitively say if message volume is statistically important in comparing 
the predictability of the market behaviour of many traded assets. 
In analysing five well-known stocks we might have missed interesting phenomena in other areas. 
Assets other than shares, such as commodities or currencies, plausibly could respond quite 
differently to sentiments. In addition, the two years of studied data do not contain a large and 
sustained market crash (as per 2008-2009, for example, during which there was no great volume of 
tweeting about stocks). We can suppose the relationship between sentiment metrics and market 
behavior will change in the course of such profound and sustained turmoil. 
The use of AƌtifiĐial Neuƌal Netǁoƌks ;͞ANNs͟Ϳ – amongst other AI-based techniques - is, arguably, 
well-suited to exploring the relationships we study (c.f. Wong, 1991). However, as a first step in 
revealing notable causal ties between variables, the regression-based method we use (founded on 
the approach of Granger, 1969) has advantages. For example, Tu, (1996) argues that regression 
reduces the risk of over-fitting, and is more appropriate to exploring theory-based (rather than 
purely-empirical) relationships. Nevertheless, future studies would benefit from exploring ANNs 
applied to granular data for many market assets and related sentiment. 
We report causal windows of several minutes for volatility. While this might be of high interest to 
some market participants, such as market makers, we remain unclear as to the general usefulness of 
this finding in market trading. The trading value for volatility indices, such as the VIX, remains 
untested. 
Finally, this study has focused on informational advantages conferred by sentiment metrics. It does 
not address the issue of whether, how much, and how quickly any such advantages are eroded or 
changed by their use in trading. 
5.2 Conclusions 
We claim empirical contributions to the research literature in two areas. First, we find limited 
evidence of Granger-causality from social media sentiment metrics to all three stock market 
behaviours considered: returns; volatility; and trading volume. These causal effects are salient over a 
time window of a minutes, whereas prior studies focus on daily data, with a few studying data 
granular to the half or quarter hour. Second, we find some modest and selective evidence of 
improved forecast errors, upon using sentiment metrics, for all of the five stocks considered. In the 
cases of Goldman Sachs and Apple, most forecast errors were improved by a sentiment-based 
prediction model. Across all five stocks, price volatility and trading volume appear more predictable 
than price direction. We specify classes of trading strategy most apt to building on such a predictive 
foundation. 
This study contributes to theory by adding to arguments in support of emotion being salient to 
investment decision making, and by finding unique evidence on the rate and manner in which 
valuable information diffuses between market participants (c.f. Hong, Lim & Stein, 2000). Our 
findings are consistent ǁith tƌadeƌs’ aĐtioŶs ďeiŶg seleĐtiǀelǇ iŶflueŶĐed ďǇ the steady accumulation 
of otheƌ tƌadeƌs’ opiŶioŶs. The fiŶdiŶgs aƌe fuƌtheƌ eŵďedded iŶ the work of Surowiecki, (2004); the 
strongest causal links between sentiment and price behaviour are found in times of strident and 
discordant market mood. The aggregated views of market participants do not, therefore, wholly 
eŵďodǇ ͞the ǁisdoŵ of the Đƌoǁds͟, aŶd Ǉet theǇ still have predictive value. Sometimes traders 
agree. Sometimes, and more notably, traders take sides. Either way, accumulated sentiment – 
concordant or discordant – has modestly predictable consequences for markets. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (Feb 17th 2012 to Oct 17th 2014) 
 Apple Amazon Goldman Sachs Google IBM 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
 (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) 
      
B 0.103 0.013 0.007 0.022 0.005 
 (0.598) (0.262) (0.157) (0.303) (0.145) 
A 0.353 0.067 0.023 0.089 0.020 
 (0.470) (0.248) (0.149) (0.283) (0.139) 
      
Return 0.055 0.225 0.364 0.350 -0.103 
 (0.122) (0.133) (0.098) (0.099) (0.079) 
Volume 12.596 9.231 9.290 9.229 9.519 
 (0.842) (0.925) (0.833) (1.011) (0.759) 
Variance 0.015 0.018 0.010 0.010 0.006 
 (0.231) (0.287) (0.052) (0.154) (0.127) 
Realized  0.178 0.209 0.161 0.154 0.116 
Variance (0.206) (0.212) (0.148) (0.158) (0.133) 
Notes: Values in the table are the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of 
the sentiment indices and financial indicators of the different stock indices. The mean 
of returns is in thousands. B represents the Bullishness index while A stands for the 
Agreement index.  
 
 
Table 2. Spearman Correlation coefficients between sentiment data indices and 
financial variables of a sample of stock indices 
 Apple Amazon Goldman 
Sachs 
Google IBM 
 
B A B A B A B A B A 
 
          
Return 0.009* -0.003 0.003 0.004 0.006* 0.008* 0.013* 0.002 0.008* 0.008* 
 
          
Volume 0.005 0.145* 0.022* 0.013* 0.033* 0.080* 0.027* 0.134* 0.017* 0.083* 
 
          
Variance 0.006 0.154* 0.015* 0.106* 0.027* 0.078* 0.023* 0.111* 0.017* 0.076* 
 
          
Realized 
Variance 
0.007* 0.162* 0.015* 0.112* 0.028* 0.082* 0.023* 0.116* 0.018* 0.077* 
Notes: (*) significant at 5%. Values in the table show the Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficients between the Bullishness index (B) and the financial variable; and between the 
Agreement index (A) and the financial variable for each stock.  
 
Table 3. P-Values of Granger Causation Tests between sentiment indices and financial 
indicators of a sample of stock indices. 
 
Volatility Realized Volatility Volume Returns 
Stock IndexB A B A B A B A 
AMAZON  
       
10 LAGS 0.2412 0.5402 0.4171 0.0028*** 0.0487** 0.0000*** 0.0629* 0.6951 
20 LAGS 0.4370 0.1018 0.5046 0.0000*** 0.0525* 0.0000*** 0.0260** 0.9556 
APPLE 
        
10 LAGS 0.8513 0.1599 0.0386** 0.0002*** 0.0034*** 0.1564 0.1127 0.1282 
20 LAGS 0.7048 0.0046*** 0.0232* 0.0000*** 0.0155** 0.0031*** 0.0046*** 0.3037 
GS 
        
10 LAGS 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.8764 0.0002*** 0.0084*** 0.8748 
20 LAGS 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.4798 0.0000*** 0.0089*** 0.9890 
GOOGLE 
        
10 LAGS 0.1392 0.2163 0.0480** 0.0478** 0.9014 0.0000*** 0.0216** 0.7922 
20 LAGS 0.0160** 0.2874 0.0037*** 0.0276** 0.5029 0.0000*** 0.0369** 0.5542 
IBM 
        
10 LAGS 0.1763 0.4411 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.3088 0.0000*** 0.2768 0.4265 
20 LAGS 0.1384 0.2759 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.5999 0.0000*** 0.2485 0.2452 
Notes: Values in the table are the p-values of the Granger causality test as stated in Equation 
(1), where *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. In 
columns B we test whether Bullishness Granger causes the financial indicator (volatility, 
realized volatility, volume and returns) for each stock. In columns A we test whether 
Agreement Granger causes the financial indicator (volatility, realized volatility, volume and 
returns) for each stock. 
 
Table 4. Forecasting Results. MAPE and RMSE Estimates 
 
AMAZON 
Model 0: Only includes lags (n=20) for dependent variable, except for Return where n=10. 
Controls for time effects 
(1) Return, (2) Volume, (3) Volatility, (4) Realized Variance.  
(1) MAPE=102.62892  RMSE=0.15789524 
(2) MAPE=4.771451  RMSE=0.56122968 
(3) MAPE=120.68136  RMSE=0.30720081 
(4) MAPE=16.69075  RMSE=0.13058024 
 
Model 1A: (Adds the Bullishness metric) 
(1) MAPE=103.06181 RMSE=0.15793618 
(2) MAPE=4.7729716 RMSE=0.56132156 
(3) MAPE=149.85669 RMSE=0.30710101 
(4) MAPE=16.719097 RMSE=0.13060939 
 
Model 1B: (Adds the Agreement metric) 
(1) MAPE=102.92471 RMSE=0.15790816 
(2) MAPE=4.7703562  RMSE=0.56100849 
(3) MAPE=143.09904  RMSE=0.30720381 
(4) MAPE=16.768402 RMSE=0.13054429 
 
APPLE 
Model 0: Only includes lags (n=20) for dependent variable, except for Return where n=10. 
Controls for time effects 
(1) Return, (2) Volume, (3) Volatility, (4) Realized Variance.  
(1) MAPE=99.768799  RMSE=0.10024473 
(2) MAPE=2.587934  RMSE=0.41124581 
(3) MAPE=181.23047  RMSE=0.01917382 
(4) MAPE=19.041611  RMSE=0.05393209 
Model 1A: (Adds the Bullishness metric) 
(1) MAPE=99.871727 RMSE=0.10025626 
(2) MAPE=2.5875969 RMSE=0.41117315 
(3) MAPE=212.96416  RMSE=0.01924627 
(4) MAPE=19.058155  RMSE=0.0539343 
Model 1B: (Adds the Agreement metric) 
(1) MAPE=99.72673 RMSE=0.10024468 
(2) MAPE=2.5873389 RMSE=0.41118618 
(3) MAPE=237.25314 RMSE=0.01924928 
(4) MAPE=18.902777 RMSE=0.05388988 
 
 
GOOGLE 
Model 0: Only includes lags (n=20) for dependent variable, except for Return where n=10. 
Controls for time effects 
(1) Return, (2) Volume, (3) Volatility, (4) Realized Variance.  
(1) MAPE=102.41462 RMSE=0.09263055 
(2) MAPE=6.0852337 RMSE=0.64821957 
(3) MAPE=129.16119 RMSE=0.02726294 
(4) MAPE=16.329178 RMSE=0.05434002 
 
Model 1A: (Adds the Bullishness metric) 
(1) MAPE=102.9474  RMSE=0.09264848 
(2) MAPE=6.0848203 RMSE=0.64819014 
(3) MAPE=166.01393 RMSE=0.02731333 
(4) MAPE=16.358107 RMSE=0.05432975  
 
 
Model 1B: (Adds the Agreement metric) 
(1) MAPE=102.53411 RMSE=0.09263535 
(2) MAPE=6.0791068 RMSE=0.64780432 
(3) MAPE=172.92926 RMSE=0.02731346 
(4) MAPE=16.275864 RMSE=0.05436601  
 
Goldman Sachs 
Model 0: Only includes lags (n=20) for dependent variable, except for Return where n=10. 
Controls for time effects 
(1) Return, (2) Volume, (3) Volatility, (4) Realized Variance.  
(1) MAPE=100.22709 RMSE=0.09024394 
(2) MAPE=4.9991579 RMSE=0.57623335 
(3) MAPE=142.74214 RMSE=0.02559098 
(4) MAPE=20.363062 RMSE=0.05597522 
Model 1A: (Adds the Bullishness metric) 
(1) MAPE=100.40341 RMSE=0.0902298 
(2) MAPE=4.999197  RMSE=0.57623128 
(3) MAPE=145.03264  RMSE=0.02558823 
(4) MAPE=20.337393  RMSE=0.05592784 
Model 1B: (Adds the Agreement metric) 
(1) MAPE=100.21034 RMSE=0.09023957 
(2) MAPE=4.998569  RMSE=0.57628744 
(3) MAPE=144.10599  RMSE=0.02558749 
(4) MAPE=20.367056 RMSE=0.05596454 
 
IBM 
Model 0: Only includes lags (n=20) for dependent variable, except for Return where n=10. 
Controls for time effects 
(1) Return, (2) Volume, (3) Volatility, (4) Realized Variance.  
(1) MAPE=99.819504 RMSE=0.06583014 
(2) MAPE=4.5258126  RMSE=0.53248495 
(3) MAPE=125.63831  RMSE=0.00791805 
(4) MAPE=18.606939  RMSE=0.03603948 
Model 1A: (Adds the Bullishness metric) 
(1) MAPE=99.940163 RMSE=0.06582234 
(2) MAPE=4.5261135  RMSE=0.53255101 
(3) MAPE=169.58861  RMSE=0.00818384 
(4) MAPE=18.648745  RMSE=0.03606617 
Model 1B: (Adds the Agreement metric) 
(1) MAPE=99.861809 RMSE=0.06582611 
(2) MAPE=4.5257297 RMSE=0.53248565 
(3) MAPE=164.94598 RMSE=0.00817617 
(4) MAPE=18.660328 RMSE=0.03604659 
Notes: Forecasting results in terms of MAPE (Mean absolute percentage error) and RMSE (Root mean 
squared error) for the financial variables studied, are presented. Underlined data indicates that the 
sentiment-based model produces smaller errors than the base model (“Model 0”). 
 
 
